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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to develop a methodology that is useful for 
analysing from a microeconomic perspective the incentives to entry, 
permanence and exit in the market for pharmaceutical generics under 
fuzzy conditions. In an empirical application of our proposed 
methodology, the potential towards permanence of labs with different 
characteristics has been estimated. The case we deal with is set in an 
open market where global players diversify into different national 
markets of pharmaceutical generics. Risk issues are significantly 
important in deterring decision makers from expanding in the generic 
pharmaceutical business. However, not all players are affected in the 
same way and/or to the same extent. Small, non-diversified generics labs 
are in the worse position. We have highlighted that the expected NPV 
and the number of generics in the portfolio of a pharmaceutical lab are 
important variables, but that it is also important to consider the degree of 
diversification. Labs with a higher potential for diversification across 
markets have an advantage over smaller labs. We have described a fuzzy 
decision support system based on the Mamdani model in order to 
determine the incentives for a laboratory to remain in the market both 
when it is stable and when it is growing. 
     Keywords: Pharmaceutical generics, Permanence, entry and exit decisions; 
Diversification; Fuzzy decision making systems; Forecasting; Uncertainty. 
 
1      Introduction 
An inevitable part of the generic drug manufacturing industry is that patents 
eventually become obsolete. When this occurs, the opportunity arises for third parties 
to exploit the market [23]. Unbranded generics start to compete with branded generics 
developed by a research-based pharmaceutical company. Nowadays, the industry is 
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witnessing increased competition from generic drugs as an unprecedented number of 
branded medicines lose patent protection. At the same time, the drugs discovered in 
the labs are not replacing the value of those medicines losing patent protection [46]. 
Patent expirations will put at risk $267bn in drugs sales through 2016, with the largest 
annual spike in expirations, worth $52bn, in 2011. Pfizer’s blockbuster cholesterol 
drug with $11bn in 2010 sales, will be the most noteworthy to go generic in 2011 [43]. 
As long as a gap remains between the number of drugs losing patent protection and 
the number of new drugs produced through R&D, it is clear that the size of the 
pharmaceutical industry will continue to contract. For some players, more mergers 
and acquisitions are likely, but others will plan to shrink, and all parts of the value 
chain from R&D through to production and sales and marketing will be affected [46].  
Progressively, the rules of the game have been changing over the last decade. In a 
recent past, generic business was considered exclusively a free riding problem for 
pharmaceutical labs with strong R&D. However, at present, free riding activities are 
better regarded than in previous times and large pharmaceuticals are also considering 
manufacturing generics as a fundamental part of their business. Thus, the next great 
opportunity for traditional drugs firms is to manufacture not only generics but also 
biosimilars (generics which are not identical copies of biotech drugs). Although 
biotech-based drugs account for only a fifth or so of global drugs sales they are 
projected to grow at double-digit rates as sales of many conventional drugs decline. 
An additional factor is that the science involved in making biosimilars is much more 
complicated than that in making ordinary generics and this is a substantial barrier to 
entry for smaller labs [42].  
Those generics that are manufactured by big pharmaceutical companies are often 
referred to as branded-generics. Branded generics are off-patent pills and potions that 
can be sold more cheaply than the on-patent variety, but which still command an 
attractive price premium mostly in poor countries due in part to the proliferation in 
local markets of unbranded generics which are fakes and drugs of dubious quality. In 
the rich world, generic drugs are advancing as a result of government action, whereas 
in the developing world it is the booming middle class that is propelling them forward 
[44]
. 
In 2010, the big pharmaceutical companies were set to enter the branded generics 
markets in full force by joining up with local generics firms to get cheap access to this 
booming niche. Some R&D labs have already experimented with licensing deals and 
alliances with Asian generics firms. Others have gone a bit further by acquiring partly 
or even fully firms specialising in branded generics. This trend could even lead to the 
end of the independent generics industry in India and it is a turning-point for the 
global generics business [44]. Uncertainty is at its pick and so are business potential 
opportunities.  
The real action now is in branded generics, which command a premium in many 
emerging markets due in part to the fear that unknown products might be fake or of 
dubious quality. By joining with local generics firms, multinationals can gain cheap 
access to the middle class in these markets. Cost-conscious governments everywhere 
are bashing pricey patented drugs even as they boost cheap generics [41]. 
In order to assess the viability of branded generics manufactured by large 
pharmaceuticals and non-branded generics manufactured by smaller labs, it is 
necessary to study the case in different regions and countries. A study in India finds 
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that difference in price-to-patient was not as huge as it is expected for generics but 
margins for retailers were very high for branded-generics. The study highlights the 
need to modify the drug price policy and regulate the mark-ups in generic supply 
chain [39].  
There are other recent studies that focus pharmaceutical generics. In the case of 
Australia, community pharmacists demonstrated a high rate of recommending generic 
substitution. However, to optimize the generic medicines utilization, patients’ 
acceptance requires further improvement. Through acceptance of substitution, the 
patients’ medicines expenditure reduced by around 21% [5]. 
In a study that focuses on the USA market, over 23% of physicians surveyed 
expressed negative perceptions about efficacy of generic drugs, almost 50% reported 
negative perceptions about quality of generic medications, and more than one quarter 
do not prefer to use generics as first-line medications for themselves or for their 
family. Older physicians were 3.3 times more likely to report negative perceptions 
about generic quality, 5.8 times more likely to report that they would not use generics 
themselves, and 7.5 times more likely to state that they would not recommend 
generics for family members. Physicians reported that pharmaceutical lab 
representatives are the most common source of information about market entry of a 
generic medication [36]. These results contrast with the fact that manufacturers seeking 
approval to market a generic drug product must submit data demonstrating that the 
generic formulation is bioequivalent to the innovator drug product [7].  
In a study about the Spanish market, it is found that the entry of a generic at a lower 
consumer price than that of the brand-name pharmaceutical or the first generic does 
not cause a voluntary reduction in the consumer price of either the brand drug or the 
first generic. Generic entry at a lower consumer price than previously existing 
pharmaceuticals always causes a slight reduction in the average price paid by the 
National Health System. The Spanish reference pricing system results in very little 
consumer price competition between generic firms [33]. 
Considering the Swedish pharmaceutical substitution reform, the price reduction due 
to the reform was estimated to average 10% and was found to be significantly larger 
for brand-name pharmaceuticals than for generics the results also imply that the 
reform amplified the effect that generic entry has on brand-name prices by a factor of 
10.  Results of demand estimation imply that the price reductions increased total 
pharmaceutical consumption by 8% [22]. 
Although economic theory indicates that it should not be necessary to intervene in the 
generic drug market through price regulation, most EU countries are regulating the 
maximum sale price of generics and the maximum reimbursement rate, especially by 
means of reference pricing systems. The available evidence indicates that price 
regulation leads to a levelling off of generic prices at a higher level than would occur 
in the absence of this regulation [34].  
The perception of the quality of generic drugs may have to do with it [41, 44]. In 
Malaysia, the majority of practitioners who participated in a study claimed that they 
actively prescribed generic medicines in their practice. There were misconceptions 
among the respondents about the concepts of "bioequivalence", "efficacy", "safety", 
and "manufacturing standards" of generic medicines. Furthermore, advertisements 
and product bonuses offered by pharmaceutical companies, patient's socio-economic 
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characteristics as well as credibility of manufacturers were factors reported to 
influence their choice of medicine [6].  
Based only on the costs of producing generic drugs, generics could be sold for a 
fraction of the total patent-drug price but they end up with a far smaller discount. 
Thus, this potential, many times, is not realised. Once the patent expires, the patent-
holder certainly loses the monopoly on the drug. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that there is a market environment similar to perfect competition.  
Once the drug becomes off-patent, previous patent-holders change pricing policies 
and their marketing strategies in an attempt to retain a high market share or play even 
harder by thwarting competition from generics offering “pay for delay” deals that 
bribe rivals to put back the launch of generics. European and USA Regulators have 
already expressed their displeasure at perceived antitrust violations [44]. 
Low cost generics of patented drugs are also available in the market via agreements 
with the drug multinational that holds the patent, as is the case of anti-AIDS drugs in 
low-income countries. Some other times, patent laws are simply disregarded. The 
price of a year’s anti-AIDS treatment was reduced dramatically by using generic 
drugs. Although this implies a dramatic cost reduction, this paper focuses only on 
non-patented generics that face generic competition. 
Given the described situation, a possible alternative would be to analyse 
pharmaceutical generics from a macroeconomic perspective. In a complementary 
paper [16], we considered the macroeconomic characteristics of pharmaceutical 
generics in four different countries taking into account the aggregate potential not 
only for manufacturing, but also for consumption. Nevertheless, the current paper 
focuses on microeconomic business incentives. 
Patents expire at different times in different countries and the percentage of medicines 
that are manufactured as generics vary substantially thereby making the International 
Trade Organisation a key player in the possible importations, exportations [15] and 
manufacturing of generics. Previous papers on the subject of pharmaceutical generics 
in one or more countries highlight both the growing interest in the study of the 
generics and the differences between some countries and others [8, 12, 13, 31, 38]. 
The European Commission’s modification of the legislation on drugs and its practical 
implementation in each different country [35] establishes the same competition 
framework for generic pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical 
multinationals in those cases in which the product patents have expired. The practice 
of country-specific price discrimination based on buying power is widely accepted in 
Europe for patented drugs. 
In some countries, the National Health System usually negotiates a reduction in the 
prices of patented medicines, although eventually this might occur at the expense of 
the generics market. The effect that patent protection and reference prices exert on 
potential entrants and current stakeholders willing to enter the market of generics is 
also worthy of study. There is consequently a need to take into account the effect that 
the Health System reform and the new regulations will exert [1, 10, 14]. Our analysis 
focuses on the marketing of pharmaceutical generics that differently sized 
manufacturers put into practice, i.e., from small-scale labs to pharmaceutical 
multinationals. The present work describes a methodology designed to systematically 
study the incentives to remain in generic pharmaceutical markets. 
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In the 1990s, faced with new market conditions, laboratories had to refocus their 
competitive strategies towards increasing production efficiency or towards reinforcing 
R&D activities. Laboratories were used to mainly marketing two types of 
pharmaceutical products: in-house products (which generally provide the highest 
profit margins) and licensed products (developed by other labs, though still patent-
protected products). Now there is a third alternative slowly gaining a market share: 
the marketing of generics [21]. 
We have briefly described the status quo of the competition framework in the generic 
pharmaceutical business: the main characteristics that affect the profit capacity and 
the risks involved when product patents expire. However, the complexity of changes 
in this field and the high number of stakeholders involved do not help to obtain a clear 
cut evaluation of the pros and cons of opportunities in pharmaceutical generics [29]. 
Pharmaceutical generic substitution rules and price regulations vary across countries 
and it is difficult to assess the impact of such rules on the competition framework of a 
specific market.  
Generics are viewed as a potential solution to the problem of rising pharmaceutical 
costs in societies with ever-increasing health demands. In order to build a framework 
for the current study, after interviewing decision-makers in enterprise as well as in 
national and regional governments, doctors and other stakeholders, our first step was 
to develop a methodology to examine the decision to participate in a generic 
pharmaceutical market and then to apply this methodology to the Spanish market [17, 
18]
. Decisions to enter generic pharmaceutical markets were initially the key issue [30], 
although incentives to remain (entry as well as exit incentives) are now very relevant, 
given current uncertainties. 
Although increased use of generic medicines is a way to reduce spending, uncertainty 
about future market size remains high. Most of the value of generics labs lies in their 
growth potential. Some patterns arise from different markets [45] but risks and returns 
are still not clear. 
The aforementioned studies that compare the market situation in several countries as 
well as those that focus on a single country [17, 37] show the peculiarities of each 
country and its differences with the rest. Our methodology will make it possible to 
exploit this information with the aim of evaluating the economic incentives to 
manufacture pharmaceutical generics in a given country. 
The present paper attempts to help reduce this uncertainty by intensive application of 
fuzzy decision support systems that take into account extensive diversification in 
alternative generic pharmaceutical markets.  
Recent merger and takeover trends among generics labs or between R&D labs and 
generic firms [44, 46] are difficult to explain when the barriers to entry and exit are very 
low in the generic pharmaceutical business. If the barriers are very low, entry to the 
market is always possible without the need for an acquisition. Once in the market, 
there exists the need to assess whether it is worth remaining or exiting. However, this 
is not the case and incentives to remain have to be evaluated, which is the aim of this 
paper. Smaller labs interested in analysing investment opportunities in the generic 
pharmaceutical market do not have a clear idea of the future, but there may be 
incentives for large labs to build a portfolio of local generic pharmaceutical labs in 
different countries in order to diversify risks. Thus, diversification is the key concept 
in explaining recent acquisition moves in the generic pharmaceutical market. 
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The effect of government regulations and decisions is not easy to interpret and these 
represent another source of uncertainty. Risk issues are significantly important in 
deterring decision makers from expanding in the generic pharmaceutical business. 
However, not all players are affected in the same way and/or to the same extent. 
Small, non-diversified generics labs are in the worse position. There is, however, 
room for optimism: the number of generic drugs has increased in the past and will 
increase in the future because patent expiry is inevitable and cannot generally be 
postponed.  
It is worth noticing again that patent expirations will put at risk $267bn in drugs sales 
through 2016 [43]. The exact moment a generic pharmaceutical business will take off 
in a given market will always be unknown, but it is nevertheless wise to be prepared. 
Fuzzy decision support systems can take into account uncertainty in more –and more 
flexible– scenarios, thereby facilitating decisions for decision makers.  
Recent moves by multinational pharmaceutical labs to buy (or merge with) other 
generics labs cannot be explained without introducing the concept of diversification. 
If everyone is free to launch a generics lab, why should one company take over 
another one at a premium and at considerable expense, instead of simply launching a 
new one?  
If generics can be exported and imported [25] and if competition in the market results 
in the penetration of pharmaceutical generics in said market in a brief period of time 
once the patent has expired [27], generics manufacturers should not be sold at a 
premium over their fixed assets value. In other words, their intangible assets should 
be near to zero. 
Despite this apparent logic, examples of mergers abound.  
Novartis is a traditionally R&D-focused Swiss pharmaceutical company who has been 
purchasing generic firms in the past. In 2005 it announced the purchase of Hexal, a 
German generics firm, and another company in the USA, Eon Labs, for a combined 
cost of $8.3 billion. Novartis has a generics division, called Sandoz, Novartis also 
paid over $8 billion in cash for these two generics labs with combined annual sales of 
less than $2.5 billion. Hexal and Eon would provide Novartis with more than one 
hundred and twenty new generic drugs and an extensive pipeline of new generic 
medicines [40]. These acquisition deals served to further separate Novartis from its 
competitors and peers. Whilst other international pharmaceutical labs still focus 
almost exclusively on R&D and patent-covered drugs and lobby to strengthen patent 
laws, Novartis has decided to bet strongly on generics, creating the world’s largest 
manufacturer of generic drugs. Novartis also decided to acquire other labs instead of 
simply growing internally in the generic pharmaceutical business. Sales of biosimilars 
at Sandoz reached $118m in 2009 [42]. 
Given this scenario, it is important to reconsider the specific supply and demand 
characteristics of a market in order to assess not only the decisions to enter, but also 
those incentives to remain in or exit the generic pharmaceutical business. Moreover, 
given the experience and production facilities of large pharmaceutical companies, the 
in-house production of generics is clearly a positive net present value investment. 
However, this is not so clear in the case of small companies attempting to assess the 
incentives to remain in the market. Latent positions (firms with all the legal permits, 
but with very low economic activity) of small pharmaceutical labs are not 
strategically as viable as latent positions of larger generic pharmaceutical labs with 
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stakes in different countries or multinational labs with relevant R&D activity that also 
have a significant stake in the generic pharmaceutical business.  
The potential for growth in the generic pharmaceutical market is huge, despite the 
aforementioned uncertainties, although the potential may not be fulfilled in the near 
future. Pharmaceutical labs are reluctant to lose cash flows when patents expire and 
try to maintain their original market share. 
Analysis of our results leads us to state that the option of waiting until a given generic 
pharmaceutical market takes off has a lower cost and higher value for well diversified 
pharmaceutical firms, which will condition the structure of the generic pharmaceutical 
industry. We expect a higher concentration and lower number of active generics labs. 
Large generic pharmaceutical labs are expected to enter, while small ones are 
expected to exit, i.e., small generic pharmaceutical labs will be picked off by larger 
ones. 
It is interesting to evaluate generic drug opportunities in order to reduce uncertainty 
and to help in the decision process. This is why we are still systematically studying 
the viability of taking a decision to enter, be active in or exit the generic 
pharmaceutical market. In this paper, we model the decision to remain in or leave the 
market that a generics lab must take by means of a fuzzy decision support system, 
which is described in greater detail in the Methodology section. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the different steps 
into which the methodology proposed in this paper is divided. The aim of this 
methodology is to quantify and limit the returns and risks that a generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer has in a market. Section 3 describes how this general 
methodology was applied to the Spanish case analysing a number of different 
scenarios, while Section 4 presents the conclusions of the paper. 
 
2      Methodology 
The main contribution of this paper is methodological in nature. The methodology is 
intended to provide companies that are considering entering, staying in or exiting a 
market with a good decision-making framework.  
We consider the Spanish case in order to show an application of the proposed 
methodology. Despite previous legislation in Spain (RD 2402 / 2004 & Ley 29/2006), 
expectations of a rapid growth of pharmaceutical generics have not materialised in 
practice. New legislation has been passed in 2010 (RD 4/2010 & RD 8/2010) in order 
to try to cut costs in the middle of a strong economic crisis and foster generics but 
Spain’s generics labs still face high uncertainty. Pharmacies now have lower margins 
when dispensing generics, while reference pricing policy has not helped much. 
Though the methodology is applied to the Spanish market, it is also applicable to and 
valid for other markets.  
There is no standard approach to the specific problem of determining whether 
entering the generic pharmaceutical business creates value or not. Our approach was 
to conduct several brainstorming sessions firstly to develop a Delphi questionnaire 
that would allow us to achieve quantitative estimates of potential sales, cost and cash 
flows and payback periods for an investor in generics laboratories. This data would 
enable us to calculate the lab’s value generation. Secondly, this information would 
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allow us to define a decision system that would make it possible to obtain the degree 
of incentive for staying in the generic pharmaceutical market as a function not only of 
the aforementioned quantitative data, but also of qualitative-type variables that 
influence the incentive for remaining in the market. Between each brainstorming 
session, the analysis of the problem was further refined to provide a consistent 
methodological process. 
Although it is possible to evaluate the demand, i.e., the intention of consumers to buy 
generics [20], drugs market potential can also be evaluated from the offer side. 
Accordingly, a two-round Delphi questionnaire was initially designed. The 
corresponding questionnaires to both Delphi rounds are available on demand. The 
questionnaire and the kind of information that we expected to obtain are briefly 
described below. The questionnaire was sent to twelve Spanish manufacturers of 
generics. Only four of them decided to take part in the study. Although it is obvious 
that a higher response rate would have made it possible to obtain more accurate 
estimates, the methodology would have remained the same. The questionnaire 
included a battery of questions on the present and future status of the generic 
pharmaceutical market and the prospects of business opportunities in Spain. The 
Delphi Technique was applied in order to build up a consensus view of the subject, 
based upon the opinions and views of a range of experts from the field of generic 
medicine labs. 
Respondents were told that there were no right answers to the questions posed. The 
goal of the research project was to provide a wide-ranging overview of the views of 
market-related laboratories. Average scores and typical deviations would be measured 
and the reasons that might lead a particular participant to hold opinions that clashed 
with the standard opinion of the survey would also be focused on. All participants in 
the survey received a second version of the questionnaire that included the average 
scores for each of the questions, thereby providing participants with a tool describing 
the opinion of a group of experts. 
The aim of the first round was to obtain an initial estimation of cash flow and 
investment payback periods. The output of this process was a number of potential 
sales, costs and flow scenarios. The second round served to limit possible scenarios 
and to validate replies, avoiding possible contradictions between different responses. 
Thus, eight different scenarios in which a laboratory could compete in the generic 
pharmaceutical market were defined. The eight scenarios differ in terms of the 
number of generics, the expected sales per generic and whether there is growth in 
sales or not [18].  
For each of the eight defined scenarios, the expected net present value (NPV) was 
computed through the standard expected NPV formula. However, the Net Present 
Value (NPV) function is difficult to evaluate because participants lack precise 
information. In estimating cost of capital, cash flows and payback periods, managers 
consider a variety of factors and their relationships. We thus adapted the first-step 
methodology described above to take into account the fact that participants lack 
precise information to estimate cash flows and payback periods while deciding how 
many generics to include in their portfolios and the fact that large labs are in a better 
position to diversify across markets than small labs.  
In estimating the value of remaining in the generic pharmaceutical business, managers 
consider a variety of factors and the relationships between them. The NPV, the 
number of generics in portfolio and the degree of diversification of the lab were 
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highlighted as the three most relevant factors. Some of these factors exhibit 
qualitative characteristics whose evaluation might be difficult to specify precisely (for 
instance, it would be more difficult to specify a lab’s degree of diversification with a 
score of 2 on a numeric scale ranging from 1 to 10 than define it as a “low” degree of 
diversification among the language labels set {low, medium, high}). 
Thus, with the aim of including the different factors that influence the decision of 
whether to stay in the generic pharmaceutical market, and given the fact that there 
was a certain degree of uncertainty when defining the values of some of these, fuzzy 
decision support systems were considered a good option to deal with the problem. 
Fuzzy decision support systems are based on the theory of fuzzy sets [47] and allow an 
uncertainty component to be incorporated into models, making them more effective in 
terms of approximating to reality [26]. Linguistic variables can be used to handle 
qualitative or quantitative information, so that its content can be labelled taking words 
from common or natural language as values. This contrasts with numeric variables, 
which can only take numbers as values [9]. All fuzzy decision-taking problems require 
a knowledge base provided by an expert who is able to explain how the system works 
through a set of linguistic rules involving the system’s input and output variables. The 
system’s variables, i.e., the form and range of the labels for each variable, must be 
defined in fuzzy form. This is what Mamdani fuzzy decision support systems depend 
on to model systems in a process composed of five stages: the fuzzification of the 
input variables, the application of fuzzy operators (AND/OR) to each rule’s 
antecedent, the implication process of each rule’s antecedent to the consequent, the 
consequent aggregation process, and the defuzzification process [4].  
The use of fuzzy decision support systems in the context of pharmaceutical generics 
has the advantage of allowing for flexibility in the construction of the system, 
swiftness in interpreting the results offered by the inference and surface maps and the 
ease with which a sensitivity analysis of the potential behavior of generics 
manufacturers under different scenarios. In order to determine the potential 
consumption and the potential production of pharmaceutical generics in different 
countries, fuzzy decision support systems were developed in a complementary paper 
[16]
 aimed at analysing the aggregate demand and the aggregate supply features of the 
generic pharmaceutical market from a macroeconomic perspective.  
In our case, there are three input variables: the NPV, the number of generics in 
portfolio, and the degree of diversification. Figure 1 shows the labels and ranges 
defined for these variables. 
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Fig. 1:  Labels and ranges for input and output variables. 
 
It is worth noting that the three fuzzy labels corresponding to the expected Net Present 
Value (NPV) variable –low, medium, high– were derived from values estimated in the 
two-round Delphi questionnaire, within the range (-500x103 €, 185x106 €).  
The number of generics (which is an endogenous strategic variable that generics labs 
are able to decide upon) was separated from the expected NPV (which is an 
exogenous variable that depends on total market growth, government regulations and 
third parties decisions). In other words, generics labs were allowed to vary the number 
of generics in their portfolio significantly, but were unable to significantly affect 
expected NPV. The maximum value for the variable “number of generics” (GEN) was 
set to “30”. Its domain was divided into three labels –low, medium, high– in a 
symmetric way.  
We also considered the degree of diversification as a key variable. Diversification into 
alternative markets or being a branch of a large pharmaceutical multinational is an 
advantage that can only be enjoyed by large stakeholders and is unavailable to small 
ones. Three labels were also considered for the variable “degree of diversification” 
(DIVERS) –low, medium and high– which partition the range of this variable in a 
symmetric way. The range for this variable is measured on a scale of between 0 and 5 
points. 
Our system’s output variable is the degree of incentive for a lab to remain (PERM-
INCENT) in the generic pharmaceutical market. According to Picture 1, this variable 
was defined within a range measured on a scale from 0 to 100 percentage points, eight 
labels being defined within that range –mf1, mf2, …, mf8– which identify different 
categories of growing incentive to remain in the generic pharmaceutical market.  
Two fuzzy decision support systems – both based on the Mandami Model [28]– were 
applied in this paper. They were generated by MATLAB 6.0 – Fuzzy Logic Toolbox 
(v. 2.0). These systems are able to determine the incentives for a lab to remain in the 
generic pharmaceutical market (PERM-INCENT) on the basis of three input 
variables: the expected NPV of the lab (NPV), its portfolio of generics (GEN) and its 
degree of diversification (DIVERS). Each of these two decision support systems can 
be applied to its specific scenario: one to a stable market scenario and the other to a 
growth market scenario. Although variables were defined in the same way in the two 
scenarios, the output of the 27 rules proposed for collecting the knowledge of the 
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decision differs substantially in both scenarios (self-evidently, in the market growth 
scenario, incentives to remain are significantly higher). 
The structure of the decision system’s rules is of the type: “if ((NPV is low) & (GEN 
is med) & (DIVERS is high)), then (PERM-INCENT is mf5)”. As each one of the 
three input variables can take one of three categories or classes (low, medium or 
high), the decision framework makes use of up to 27 rules to assign the level of 
incentive to remain in the market (in each rule, one of eight labels can be assigned to 
the output variable). 
Once the knowledge base is defined (entry and exit variables and decision rules), the 
fuzzy inference process (Mandami type) is obtained for each input tern of “crisp” 
values. As an example, Picture 2 depicts the inference process of the decision 
supplied by the system in the stable market scenario for a laboratory whose input 
variables values were: NPV=20x106 €, GEN=18, DIVERS=4. It can be observed that 
for these values the system supplies a degree of permanence in the market of 71.4% 
for the lab, which indicates a high degree of incentive to continue to manufacture 
generics in the market. 
 
 
Fig. 2:  The inference process. 
A summary of inference results is presented in the next section in graphic format 
using the “surface viewer” of the Matlab Fuzzy Toolbox. The advantage of this way 
of representing the results is that the evolution that the incentive to remain undergoes 
can be observed as a function of any given value of two input variables for a desired 
specific value of the third input variable. 
For instance, Picture 3 depicts the aforementioned evolution for any given value of 
the “GEN” and “DIVERS” variables and the specific value NPV=20x106. The 
interpretation of the surface is intuitive: for a high expected NPV value (20x106), 
incentives to stay are high regardless of the values for the other two variables; the 
surface starts from an incentive level of around 60% in the vertical axis. Furthermore, 
increasing values of “GEN” and “DIVERS”, or the joint growth of both variables, 
result in an increase in the incentive to continue manufacturing pharmaceutical 
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generics of up to 85%, thereby recommending any lab to remain in this context of the 
generic pharmaceutical market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3:  The surface viewer. 
 
3      An Application of the Fuzzy Decision Support System to 
the Spanish Case: Results and Discussion.  
All two-by-two variable combinations for three specific values (one low, one 
medium, one high) of the third variable not involved in the graph were analysed in 
both the stable and growth scenarios. This represents the analysis of 18 surfaces. In 
this section, four out of these 18 surfaces are analysed since they constitute the most 
representative ones within the overall framework of the analysis. 
Figure 4 shows the surface evolution in a stable market scenario of the incentives for 
a lab with an intermediate degree of diversification in alternative drug markets to 
remain in the market as a function of the expected NPV and the number of generics. 
This surface highlights how the incentives to remain in the market increase 
dramatically when expected NPV is very low, whatever the number of generics. 
Incentives to remain in the market increase to values as high as 70%. It can be seen 
that remaining in the market is attractive from NPV values of around 2x107 € upward, 
since 50% of the degree of incentive is surpassed regardless of the number of generics 
in portfolio. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis of this graph shows that considering 
higher values in the degree of diversification and/or a market growth scenario, while 
keeping the same graph structure, results in a rise in the plateau value of the graph. 
The values for the degree of incentive are now over 85%, thereby recommending 
entering (or staying) in the market even more. 
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Fig. 4:  PERM-INCENT vs. (NPV & GEN) when diversification is average (Stable 
Scenario). 
 
In the stable market scenario, Figure 5 also illustrates the surface evolution of the 
incentives for a lab with a low expected NPV to remain in the market, in this case as a 
function of the level of diversification and the number of generics. In fact, the 
incentives to remain always increase as the degree of diversification increases, 
although the increase is higher for portfolios with a low number of generics. A 
portfolio with a high number of generics has high maintenance costs when expected 
NPV is low and there is no growth. Whatever the case may be, the maximum levels of 
incentive achieved hardly reach 30%, which is why incentives to exit are high for labs 
in low expected NPV cases. This situation is not sustainable in the long run unless 
some labs exit and some remain and acquire their rivals’ market share via price wars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5:  PERM-INCENT vs. (GEN & DIVERS) when NPV is low (Stable Scenario). 
 
Figure 6 illustrates the surface evolution of the incentives for a lab with a medium 
expected NPV to remain in the growth market scenario as a function of the level of 
diversification and the number of generics. 
As the degree of diversification rises, the incentives to remain increase (up to 70%). 
Incentives are higher for an intermediate number of generics in the portfolio. This is 
because maintaining too high a number of generics is costly for the lab when 
diversification is low. However, if the number of generics is too low, then clients have 
to buy their generics from a wide range of generics labs and this is not operationally 
good for clients either. Although price is the key variable, clients prefer to deal with 
suppliers with an acceptable number of generics in their portfolio. Whatever the case 
may be, it is clear that potential manufacturers of generics need to count on at least a 
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“medium” degree of diversification to obtain incentives of over 50 %, which supports 
the decision to enter (or remain) in the market. This policy of keeping a balanced 
number of generics in portfolio –the vertical intermediate plane on the graph– would 
achieve the maximisation of the incentive to stay as well as the recommendation to 
enter or remain.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6:  PERM-INCENT vs. (GEN & DIVERS) when NPV is medium (Growth 
Scenario). 
 
Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the surface evolution of the incentives for a firm with a 
high expected NPV to remain in a growth scenario as a function of the level of 
diversification and the number of generics. 
In this scenario, all the labs should choose to increase the number of generics in their 
portfolio and the incentives to remain would allow all the labs to survive: the 
minimum incentives to remain in the market are 70% and run higher than 95%. When 
the level of diversification rises, the incentives to remain are higher for all cases. 
Thus, the recommendation under these circumstances would always be to enter or 
stay in the market under study, especially for laboratories with a high number of 
generics in portfolio and/or high degrees of diversification, since these policies would 
ensure high incentives to remain in the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7:  PERM-INCENT vs. (GEN & DIVERS) when NPV is high (Growth 
Scenario). 
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The analysis of the rest of the combinations would be formulated in line with this 
same procedure, which is intuitive, flexible and easy to operate by any market analyst. 
We thus believe that the proposed decision system is sufficiently sound, since it takes 
into consideration the three most relevant variables in determining the incentive to 
remain in the generic pharmaceutical market. Furthermore, the proposed system 
allows the uncertainty associated with the evaluation of the variables involved in the 
decision model to be processed by means of the fuzzy consideration of those 
variables. Finally, the system is flexible in defining the labels associated with the 
model variables and in determining the basis for the rules that incorporate the 
knowledge of the decision-making process, which might vary depending on the 
country under study. 
 
4.      Conclusions 
Uncertainty is very high in the generic pharmaceutical business and each national 
market possesses its own peculiarities. Papers that compare different markets as well 
as papers that focus on a single country show the peculiarities of those markets and 
their differences with respect to the rest. 
Given the current economic crisis, fostering generics is a clear way to cut costs and 
some pharmaceutical labs will profit from it but not all. High uncertainty will remain 
among labs. In the present paper, we have developed a methodology that enables us to 
exploit available firm-specific information with the aim of evaluating the economic 
incentives to manufacture pharmaceutical generics in a given country. We have 
attempted to reduce this uncertainty by systematically applying a decision tool 
depending on alternative scenarios. We have considered that the expected NPV and 
the number of generics in the portfolio of a pharmaceutical lab are important 
variables, but that it is also important to consider the degree of diversification. Labs 
with a higher potential for diversification across markets have an advantage over 
smaller labs. On the basis of expected NPV and the number of generics and after 
including diversification in the analysis, we can now better understand the economic 
sense of recent mergers and acquisitions in the generic pharmaceutical business. 
We have described a fuzzy decision support system for an open market in which 
global players diversify into alternative national generics markets in order to 
determine the incentives for a laboratory to remain in the market both when it is stable 
and when it is growing. Incentives to stay in the market are significantly higher in the 
market growth scenario.  
Once the knowledge base has been defined, the fuzzy inference process is obtained 
for each input tern of values (expected NPV, number of generics and degree of 
diversification). A summary of inference results is presented in graphic format, where 
incentives to remain in the market are assessed. Although this paper has focussed on 
the Spanish case, the methodology is valid for any pharmaceutical lab in any 
pharmaceutical market. Results show the consistency and adequacy of the constructed 
decision system to account for real decisions to enter, remain in or exit the generic 
pharmaceutical market. The system offers a coherent diagnosis tool of a lab’s 
situation and also estimates how incentives fluctuate as a function of expected NPV, 
the number of generics and the degree of diversification. 
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Analysis of our results lead us to state that the option of waiting until a given generic 
pharmaceutical market takes off has lower cost and higher value for well diversified 
pharmaceutical firms, which will condition the structure of the generic pharmaceutical 
industry. We expect a higher concentration and lower number of active generics labs. 
Large generic pharmaceutical labs are expected to enter while small ones are expected 
to exit, i.e., small generic pharmaceutical labs will be picked off by larger ones. 
The proposed methodology enables users to study the incentives a company can count 
on to carry out its activity in a specific generic pharmaceutical market as a function of 
the company’s own characteristics as well as those of the market. The present 
analysis, which focuses on measuring the business attractiveness that a generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturer may have, is complemented by another study we have 
developed. This other study focuses on the business attractiveness that the generics 
market has in a country as a function of its regulation (and the way it has to put it into 
practice), the prices of medicines and wage costs. Although generics are a share of the 
total demand for pharmaceuticals, the evolution of the price of generics may be 
different from the evolution of the price of branded pharmaceutical products. In many 
countries, large pharmaceutical companies negotiate the price of branded products 
with governments. Sometimes, the negotiation also implies restrictions that affect the 
price and/or market share of generics. With these restrictions, the number of generics 
labs with incentives to stay in the market will be lower. In such a case, there will not 
be a real drop in the prices of the generic drugs; i.e., prices of generics will not be 
significantly lower than branded pharmaceuticals because of a lack of competition.  
Finally, one issue that has not been dealt with in the present paper is the viability of 
state-owned generic pharmaceutical laboratories. The existence of state-owned 
laboratories that manufacture generic medicines usually appears in countries where 
the market is not the best way to allocate resources. For example, in the Soviet Union 
era, Bulgaria used to manufacture pharmaceutical generics for many countries within 
the Soviet bloc. In recent times, the Bulgarian generics business has gradually passed 
into private hands. In the case of some countries in Latin America or Africa, private 
generic pharmaceutical labs may be substituted by a state-owned laboratory which 
may be a feasible alternative if the bargaining power of the private laboratories is too 
strong. 
 
 
References 
[1] Anell, A., 2005, “Deregulating the pharmacy market: the case of Iceland and 
Norway,” Health Policy, 75(1) pp. 9-17.  
[2] Antonanzas F., 2003, “Challenges to achieving value in drug spending in a 
decentralized country: the Spanish case.” Value Health.; 6 (1) pp. 52-63.  
[3] Barry M, Tilson L, Ryan M., 2004, “Pricing and reimbursement of drugs in 
Ireland,” European Journal of Health Economics, 5(2), pp. 190-194.  
[4] Chen, C.B. y Klein, C.M., 1997, “An efficient approach to solving fuzzy 
MADM problems.” Fuzzy Sets and Systems; 88 pp. 51–67. 
[5] Chong, C.P., March. G., Clark, A., Gilbert A., Hassali M.A. and Bahari M.B., 
2011, “A nationwide study on generic medicines substitution practices of 
 35 
Australian community pharmacists and patient acceptance,” Health Policy 
99(2), pp. 139-148.  
[6] Chua G.N., Hassali, M.A., Shafie A.A., Awaisu, A., 2010, “A survey exploring 
knowledge and perceptions of general practitioners towards the use of generic 
medicines in the northern state of Malaysia,” Health Policy, 95(2-3), pp. 229-
235.  
[7] Davit, B.M., Nwakama, P.E., Buehler G.J., Conner, D.P., Haidar S.H., Patel, 
D.T., Yang Y.S., Yu, L.X. and Woodcock, J., 2009, “Comparing Generic and 
Innovator Drugs: A Review of 12 Years of Bioequivalence Data from the 
United States Food and Drug Administration,” Annals of Pharmacotherapy, 43 
(10), pp. 1583-1597.     
[8] de Vos CM., 1996, “The 1996 pricing and reimbursement policy in The 
Netherlands,” Pharmacoeconomics, 10 (2) pp. 75-80.  
[9] Driankov, D.; Hellendoorn, H.; Reinfrank, M., 1996, “An Introduction to Fuzzy 
Control. 2nd Edition,” Springer-Verlag. Berlín. 
[10] Ess SM, Schneeweiss S, Szucs TD., 2003, “European healthcare policies for 
controlling drug expenditure,” Pharmacoeconomics, 21(2), pp. 89-103.  
[11] Garattini L, Ghislandi, S., 2006, “Off-patent drugs in Italy. A short-sighted 
view?” European Journal of Health Economics, 7(1) pp. 79-83.  
[12] Garattini L, Salvioni F, Scopelliti D, Garattini S., 1994 , “A comparative 
analysis of the pharmaceutical market in four European countries,” 
Pharmacoeconomics, 6(5) pp. 417-23.  
[13] Garattini L, Tediosi F., 2000, “A comparative analysis of generics markets in 
five European countries,” Health Policy, 51(3) pp. 149-62.  
[14] Garattini S., 1998, “The drug market in four European countries,” 
Pharmacoeconomics, 14 (1) pp. 69-79.  
[15] Garmaise D., 2005, “Canadian developments. Bill to export generic drugs 
comes into force,” HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review. 10 (2), p. 17.  
[16] Gascón, F., D. de la Fuente, J. Puente & J. Lozano, 2007, “On macroeconomic 
characteristics of pharmaceutical generics and the potential for manufacturing 
and consumption under fuzzy conditions” Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 
41, pp. 223-235. 
[17] Gascón, F.; de la Fuente, D.; Lozano, J.; Fernández, I.; Artime, M.A., 2004, 
“Effect of Regulation and Market Structure on the Allocation of Resources in 
the Pharmaceutical Generics Business,” International Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence. Paper ID # ICA2485. Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. 
[18] Gascón, F.; de la Fuente, D.; Puente, J. and Fernández, I., 2005, “Entry and Exit 
Decisions in Alternative Pharmaceutical Generic Markets,” International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Paper ID # ICA3405. Las Vegas, Nevada, 
USA. 
[19] Ghislandi, S., Krulichova, I., Garattini, L., 2005, “Pharmaceutical policy in 
Italy: towards a structural change?”, Health Policy, 72(1) pp. 53-63.  
 36 
[20] Gonzalez Hernando S, Gonzalez Mieres C, Diaz Martin AM., 2003, “Intention 
of purchasing generic prescription drugs on the part of consumers in Asturias 
Spain.” Revista Española de Salud Pública.; 77(6) pp. 691-9.  
[21] González, E. and Gascón, F., 2004, “Sources of productivity growth in the 
Spanish pharmaceutical industry (1994-2000),” Research Policy, 33 pp. 735-
745. 
[22] Granlund, D., 2010, “Price and welfare effects of a pharmaceutical substitution 
reform,” Journal of Health Economics 29(6), pp. 856-865.     
[23] Hudson, J., 2000, “Generic take-up in the pharmaceutical market following 
patent expiry. A multi-country study,” International Review of Law and 
Economics. 20 (2) pp. 205-221. 
[24] Huttin C., 1994, “The Chinese medicines market: moving towards a market 
system?”, Health Policy.; 29(3) pp. 247-59.  
[25] Kondro W., 2003, “Canada to change patent law to allow export of cheap 
drugs.” Lancet.; 362(9392): 1290.  
[26] Lootsma, F., 1997, “Fuzzy Logic for Planning and Decision-Making,” Kluwer, 
Dordrecht. 
[27] Magazzini L, Pammolli F, Riccaboni M., 2004, “Dynamic competition in 
pharmaceuticals. Patent expiry, generic penetration, and industry structure,” 
European Journal of Health Economics.; 5(2) pp. 175-82.  
[28] Mamdani, E.H.; Gains, B.R., 1981, “Fuzzy Reasoning and its Applications,” 
New York: Academic Press. 
[29] McGettigan P, McManus J, O'Shea B, Chan R, Feely J., 1997, “Low rate of 
generic prescribing in the Republic of Ireland compared to England and 
Northern Ireland: prescribers' concerns,” Irish Medical Journal, 90(4) pp. 146-7.  
[30] Morton, F.M., 1999, “Entry Decisions in the Pharmaceutical generics Industry,” 
Rand Journal of Economics, 30(3), pp. 421-440. 
[31] Mossialos E, Oliver A., 2005, “An overview of pharmaceutical policy in four 
countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,” 
International Journal of Health Planning and Management, 20 (4) pp. 291-306. 
[32] Paraponaris, A.; Verger, P.; Desquins, B.; Villani, P.; Bouvenot, G.; Rochaix, 
L.; Gourheux, J.C.; Moatti, J.P., 2004, “Delivering generics without regulatory 
incentives? Empirical evidence from French general practitioners about 
willingness to prescribe international non-proprietary names.” Health Policy.; 
70(1) pp. 23-32.  
[33] Puig-Junoy, J. Moreno-Torres, I., 2010, “Do generic firms and the Spanish 
public purchaser respond to consumer price differences of generics under 
reference pricing?,” Health Policy 98 (2-3) pp. 186-194.     
[34] Puig-Junoy, J., 2010, “Impact of European Pharmaceutical Price Regulation on 
Generic Price Competition A Review,” Pharmacoeconomics 28 (8) pp. 649-663.  
[35] Rovira J., 1996, “Are national drug expenditure control policies compatible with 
a single European market?”, Pharmacoeconomics, 10 (2) pp. 4-13.  
 37 
[36] Shrank, W.H., Liberman, J.N., Fischer, M.A, Girdish, C., Brennan T.A. and 
Choudhry, N.K., 2011, “Physician Perceptions About Generic Drugs,” Annals 
of Pharmacotherapy 45(1) pp. 31-38.     
[37] Silversides A., 2004, “FTAA could interfere with proposed Canadian patent 
legislation allowing generic exports,” Can Med Assoc J.; 170(6), pp. 937.  
[38] Simoens S., De Bruyn K., Bogaert M., Laekeman G., 2005, “Pharmaceutical 
policy regarding generic drugs in Belgium. Pharmacoeconomics” 23(8), pp. 
755-66.  
[39] Singal, G.L. Nanda, A., Kotwani, A., 2011, “A comparative evaluation of price 
and quality of some branded versus branded-generic medicines of the same 
manufacturer in India,” Indian Journal of Pharmacology 43 (2), pp. 131-136.     
[40] The Economist, 2005, “Combination therapy. Novartis buys two generic 
drugmakers,” Feb 24th. 2005. 
[41] The Economist, 2009, “Friends for life. Big pharmaceutical firms are learning to 
love their erstwhile enemies, makers of generic drugs,” Aug 6th 2009.  
[42] The Economist, 2010, “Attack of the biosimilars. Biotechnology drugs are the 
next target for cheaper versions,” The Economist Oct 21st 2010. 
[43] The Economist, 2010, “Health care,” From The World In 2011 print edition. 
Nov 22nd 2010. 
[44] Vaitheeswaran, V., 2009, “Generically challenged. The pharmaceuticals 
industry may yet find inspiration in its old nemesis, the generic-drugs business,” 
The Economist. Nov 13th 2009. 
[45] Wiktorowicz, ME., 2003, “Emergent patterns in the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals: institutions and interests in the United States, Canada, Britain, 
and France,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 28(4): 615-58.  
[46] Witty, A., 2010, “Research and Develop,” The Economist. November 22nd 
2010. 
[47] Zadeh, L.A., 1965, "Fuzzy Sets", Information and Control.; 8: 338-353. 
 
 
